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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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      NEWMONT MINING CORPORATION,
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                     Plaintiff,
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                                                17 Cv. 8065 (RA)
                 v.
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      ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LIMITED,
      et al.,
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                     Defendants.
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                                                November 14, 2018
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                                                4:00 p.m.
      Before:
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                             HON. JAMES L. COTT,
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                                                Magistrate Judge
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                                 APPEARANCES
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      BALLARD SPAHR LLP
           Attorneys for Plaintiff
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      BY: GREGORY P. SZEWCZYK
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      CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE
          Attorneys for Defendants
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      BY: LAUREN A. MOSKOWITZ
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(In chambers; phone conference)

THE COURT: Good afternoon. This is Judge Cott.

Could you please state your name for the record for the court reporter.

MR. SZEWCZYK: Greg Szewczyk, with Ballard Spahr, on behalf of plaintiff, Newmont Mining Corporation. Also in my office with me is Nancy Lipson, who is in-house counsel for Newmont Mining.

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is Lauren Moskowitz, from Cravath, Swaine & Moore, on behalf of defendants.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to all of you.

I think just to try and dispense with something straightforward, with respect to the motion to seal the Exhibit D issue, I have reviewed all of that, and it seems to me that the defendants' proposed redactions to Exhibit D seem appropriate at this moment in time, without prejudice to them being unredacted in further submissions if there is a basis to do so, but the redactions seem relatively modest and related to matters at least not at the heart of things at the moment. So as to that, I would just ask that the plaintiff refile with the redacted version of Exhibit D that the defendants have submitted to the Court. That seems like a straightforward matter.

Does that raise any concerns for anybody?

		MR.	. SZEWCZYK:	: No c	oncern	s for	newmont	your ,	Honor,
and	we	will	certainly	refile	with t	the r	redacted	version	ì.

THE COURT: The next thing I wanted to ask, trying to deal with what I will call low-hanging fruit, potentially, before we get to the nub of the matter, is I know there was an application for the issuance of letters rogatory that defendants filed last week.

Do the plaintiffs have any opposition to that for any reason? I have seen nothing filed, but I just wanted to confirm that there was none.

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, I have not personally been dealing with that. I believe that Newmont does plan to file a short opposition, but I can't say with 100 percent certainty. If we will, would you like us to file by a date certain?

THE COURT: How about Friday?

MR. SZEWCZYK: That should not be a problem, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you know what the nature of the objection would be to it?

MR. SZEWCZYK: I believe that it would have to deal with the presumptive deposition limits, or the deposition limits that we have already agreed to and the fact that we are past those. But again, I have not been personally involved in that so I don't want to say anything definitively just yet.

THE COURT: OK. I am just trying to obviate the need

for a further conference, but perhaps it's something I will be able to deal with without having another conference. We will see what gets filed, and then depending on what gets filed, we will figure out whether we need to have another conference or whether I can resolve it on the papers.

I gather when you say the presumptive number of depositions, meaning each said has agreed to and/or has already taken ten fact depositions, is that what you mean by that?

MR. SZEWCZYK: That's correct, your Honor. I also believe that Mr. Leland, who filed the application, and Ms. Wallace from my office are planning to confer on Friday. So this may be something that resolves itself. I am just not sure yet.

THE COURT: Well, I guess what would be helpful to me is either file whatever opposition there is going to be or file a letter indicating that there is no opposition by Friday.

MR. SZEWCZYK: All right, your Honor. We absolutely will.

Ms. Moskowitz, I assume that this application was served on the nonparty?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Your Honor, I am not aware of the facts on that. Cravath is unable to be adverse to the counterparty there and Mr. Leland is handling that so I am not familiar with the status. I apologize. I am happy to ask Mr. Leland that and we can get back to your Honor promptly on that

in whatever manner you prefer.

THE COURT: Well, I just want to make sure that if there is no objection from the plaintiff, there isn't some potentially separate issue that's going to be interposed here with respect to the subject of the letters rogatory. That's all. And this was submitted, I guess, last Thursday. So I don't know how much time, if they were going to interpose something, they thought they would have to do so. Obviously nothing has been submitted. It would be helpful if you could have your colleague advise the Court by the end of the week whether they know of any objection that's going to be interposed by the nonparty.

MS. MOSKOWITZ: I will do so, your Honor.

THE COURT: So with those preliminaries out of the way, why don't we then I guess take up the application that the plaintiff has made.

So, Mr. Szewczyk, my threshold question is a timing one, which is, at least from the record in front of the Court, it appears that you all have had this information and the redactions that the defendants have interposed for a long period of time, months now. Why was there such a delay in bringing this to the Court's attention when it, I think, sort of postdates some depositions that would, I gather, have to be reopened in the best-case scenario for you? Why wasn't this something brought to the Court's attention sooner?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, to answer that, it really goes to the redacted notes of Mr. Chancellor, who we were not sure, based on the redactions and the information we had, exactly who was present at that meeting. So it wasn't until Mr. Chancellor's deposition that we learned that the other attendees at that meeting included individuals who were full-time CC&V operators, always located at the CC&V site. And since we knew that we might need to move on that, depending on the nature of Mr. Chancellor's testimony, we didn't want to raise the earlier issue, the issues related to the two CC&V attorneys as we defined them, so that we can put everything before the Court at one time.

THE COURT: All right. Moving to the merits then, why are you referring to Ms. Martelon and Mr. Christensen as CC&V attorneys? It doesn't seem to me that that's a fair characterization based on the record before the Court.

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, from the evidence that we have seen, both from the testimony and the documents, although there has been some characterizations of them as doing various services on behalf of AGA North America, everything we have seen has been working to help CC&V comply with various different tasks; from everything we have seen, it just appears that they were working full time on behalf of CC&V to the point where Mr. Christensen was paid severance when he was no longer retained afterwards.

So from our perspective, especially given the nature of the entries that we pointed to, it looks like, at least with respect to those entries, they had to have been working to some extent on behalf of CC&V, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, my understanding is that anything where these attorneys acted on behalf of or in the interest of CC&V or AGA Colorado has been produced, or would be produced. And the distinction, as I understand it, that the defendants are making is that, where these attorneys worked on a matter for AGA that related to AGA Colorado or CC&V, then they weren't producing it, and that's the distinction they are making. And why isn't that a legitimate distinction to make here?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, we actually agree on that distinction. I think the difference of opinion is to whether or not they were acting entirely on behalf of AngloGold North America in these specific entries. We did not challenge every single entry that involved Mr. Christensen or Ms. Martelon Evans. We only selected ones where, based on the nature of the description, it seemed like, at least to some extent, they were necessarily acting on behalf of CC&V or AGA Colorado.

Specifically, with respect to the litigations, based on the descriptions in the privilege log, these appear to be talking about litigations where the only defendants or parties were CC&V and AngloGold Colorado. And so based on those descriptions, to us it seems, at least to some extent, it's

very likely that they were acting on behalf of those subsidiaries as opposed to the parent companies, your Honor.

THE COURT: What is it in the privilege log descriptions that gives you that impression? Because I don't quite follow that, but it may just be that I am not understanding.

MR. SZEWCZYK: With respect to the litigation specifically, there was no parent company who was a party to any of those litigations. And so when the descriptions talk about draft summaries of litigation costs, or other specific matters relating to the litigation, to Newmont that indicates that at least to some degree they were acting on behalf of the parties to that litigation, and, therefore, that would be a privilege that would be owned, at least in part, by CC&V or AGA Colorado, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Moskowitz, can you speak to that issue a little bit for me?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Yes, I can. Thank you, your Honor.

The fact that a parent was not a party to the litigation does not mean that the advice to the parent and parent company was not provided related to those litigations. So at least one document I have in front of me is advice to the parent about the litigation and not advice to CC&V about the litigation.

THE COURT: Well, is this a question a little bit of

the description in the privilege log perhaps not being as comprehensive as it could be in order for the plaintiff to understand that?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: I don't think so, your Honor. Because the one example I just gave, which is AGA PRIV 3595, which is on page 3 from the bottom of our Exhibit A, says "privileged communication and attachment with inside counsel providing legal advice regarding draft AGA executive management report concerning Mill construction status." So I think it's pretty clear that that is advice in connection with the parent executive management level. So I don't think it's vague.

THE COURT: I mean, I don't really know at the end of the day the best result here. I think that you all agree to the general overarching principle that I would be guided by here, which is that, as I said, and Mr. Szewczyk you agreed with this, that where these attorneys were acting on behalf of or in the interest of AGA Colorado and CC&V they should be produced, and I think indeed there has been production along those lines, but where they worked on matters for AGA that related to AGA Colorado or CC&V they need not be produced. And the question is you're questioning whether what is in the privilege log falls into category B as opposed to category A, if you will.

I suppose I could look at these documents, but I am not sure I am well versed enough to be able to totally make

that judgment unless the documents to some extent speak for themselves. It may be that there is a certain amount of context that's required to really understand that that goes beyond. I mean, my guiding principle would be that anything that the defendants have in which these attorneys acted on behalf of AGA Colorado or CC&V should be produced.

My understanding is they have done that. Is that not right, Ms. Moskowitz?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: That is correct, your Honor. That certainly was our endeavor and the examples that were given to your Honor in the motion we confirmed were not of that ilk.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Szewczyk, if you want me to do an in camera review of these 56, I can do it. I don't know how meaningfully that will be, frankly, because it seems to me this is a somewhat nuanced set of documents related to very fact-specific relationships that I think the Court would be hard-pressed to really be able to assess. But if you think there is some possibility I can review these -- I mean, I might have to review them and then have an ex parte conversation with Ms. Moskowitz about some of them related to particular individuals or questions that I might have. I can envision that. I don't know. What do you all think?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, we certainly don't want to put you through the exercise of going through dozens of documents if there is going to be nuances that you may not have

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enough background to appreciate, and I agree with you that there are probably going to be some documents of that ilk.

I guess the only other point that may be worth bringing up is Ms. Moskowitz pointed to one of these documents that was listed as the CC&V operations versus the litigation. I think so far we have been focusing on the litigation. may be some legal issues to consider with respect to both the ones that have been labeled as diligence and also operations. Again, this is based on our review of the privilege log's descriptions, and we obviously don't have the benefit of seeing the documents. But we think under some of the guidance from cases such as Teleglobe, and then Bass Public and Polycast, all of which were cited in the motions, there are situations where, even if it is a parent company's disclosure obligation, if they are seeking information from the various subsidiaries in order to complete the necessary filings or disclosure, it forms a joint representation with respect to making that disclosure or filing. So we think some of these entries demonstrate that there could be a joint representation in such situations.

Then just the one further point to add on that is, all of the AngloGold parties, including AngloGold Colorado, had at least some obligations under the purchase agreement to make sure that all matters were complied with in material respects and all covenants required by the agreements were performed. So even if it is an AngloGold North America disclosure being

discussed, AngloGold Colorado also still had a contractual interest in making sure that all representations, warranties and disclosures were complete and accurate. So there may be somewhat more of a legal decision you can make on that point, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, my concern is the following, which defendants raised in their letter, which is I think what you're suggesting would require a pretty expansive interpretation of what the privilege agreement that you all entered into means.

I mean, when I look at it, and I look at paragraph 2(e), which is what you're citing in your letter, it says that the parties agree that the following principles apply to privileged communications that occurred prior to Newmont's acquisition.

And the documents we are talking about now fall into this category, correct?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Yes, they do.

THE COURT: So this says, for preacquisition communications made, for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance to more than one entity, the privilege is held and can be waived by each such entity.

What is the evidence in the privilege logs to suggest that these communications were made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance to more than one entity?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, I think the answer to that

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is, to extent it is relating to disclosures that are required under the purchase agreement or otherwise, all of the AngloGold parties, including AngloGold Colorado, which is now a Newmont company, had a contractual interest in ensuring that those disclosures were correct and accurate.

And so if the sellers wished to obtain separate counsel for the entity they were selling, or to designate certain attorneys and wall them off when they needed to, that was their prerogative. But because they didn't, all of the attorneys were, therefore, representing all of the AngloGold parties at that time, which included AngloGold Colorado, and were therefore providing legal advice for AngloGold Colorado.

THE COURT: Well, Ms. Moskowitz says in her letter that these 56 entries all involve communications — and I am quoting — "relating to AGA's own separate legal interests." And if that's true, then I don't see how you can prevail on these arguments. I think what you are arguing is that there is some blurring between AGA's own separate legal interest and the other AGA's interest, some of which are now your client's companies. That's what you're arguing. But if in fact these documents all do reflect communications relating to AGA's separate legal interests, then I don't see how you overcome the privilege invocation.

MR. SZEWCZYK: I think you have the issue right. It's a question of whether or not the legal interests are blurred,

in part based on the contractual obligations that are attributed to AGA parties generally as opposed to just AGA North America.

THE COURT: How can a court make a determination as to whether some e-mail or the equivalent involves a communication that wouldn't relate simply to AGA's interest but related to AGA's interest as well as an AGA's subsidiary's interest? How does a court make that distinction? I don't know how to do that.

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, I think our position on that is that in this case, with respect to the specific language under the stock purchase agreement, and I am looking at section 7.02(c), the contract itself created obligations by all AGA parties, including AngloGold Colorado, to ensure that all obligations and covenants have been met. So in this case, if it relates to a disclosure under the stock purchase agreement by any AngloGold entity, all of the AngloGold entities had an interest in ensuring that that was accurate and correct.

THE COURT: So any advice any in-house counsel for AGA may have given AGA would, by definition, redound to the benefit, if I can phrase it that way, to the AGA subsidiaries as well?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, at least with respect to the covenants and obligations that are referred to in that one

provision which puts that onus on all of the AGA parties.

THE COURT: Can I ask, were Mr. Christensen and Ms. Martelon already deposed?

MR. SZEWCZYK: No, your Honor, they have not been deposed.

THE COURT: Are you planning to depose them?

MR. SZEWCZYK: At this time their depositions have not been noticed.

THE COURT: I am trying to get a sense of how significant this all is in the grand scheme of things.

Obviously everything is significant on some level or you wouldn't seek relief from a court if it wasn't significant, but why is this something that is so important to your client that we are focusing on it in this fashion? What light will it shed here beyond what the vast record already provides to the parties?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, with respect to Mr.

Christensen and Ms. Martelon Evans, a lot of the documents

focused in on what was known and what was going on in the

underlying litigation, as I will call it, which was claims

against a contractor named FLS. And a key part of Newmont's

claims is that during this time frame when these communications

are going on, especially in the July of 2015 time frame,

AngloGold became aware of several defects and did not disclose

those to Newmont before the closing, as they were obligated to

do. And so based on the timing and topics in the descriptions that are listed here, these documents could go to some of the key aspects of the case, your Honor.

THE COURT: But if these lawyers were talking with each other and their AGA clients, why would that ever be something that wouldn't be privileged?

 $\label{eq:weak_entropy} \text{We are back to the discussion we were having a few} \\ \text{moments ago I guess.}$

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, I think it goes back to the blurred lines. With respect to the litigation discussions with outside counsel that represented CC&V and AngloGold Colorado, discussions with the outside counsel for those subsidiaries, there would be some sort of blurred lines even if there was some sort of independent privilege or interest of the parent companies. And the same thing goes with respect to the disclosures, because of AngloGold Colorado's independent interest and obligations under the stock purchase agreement, those lines get blurred again.

THE COURT: Ms. Moskowitz, do you want to be further heard on this subject?

Ms. Moskowitz, are you there?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: I am. I'm sorry. I didn't hear your Honor. I might have cut out.

THE COURT: My question was, I have been talking with your colleague on the other side about this, but I wanted to

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ask if you wanted to be heard.

MS. MOSKOWITZ: There has been a lot, your Honor. On the last point of discussion, I think that this blurred line argument winds up blowing the rule for all the reasons we have said in our letter. The idea that AGA couldn't get advice about this litigation simply because the litigation involves the asset that ultimately was sold is on the category B, I think is the category your Honor had for AGA's interest being advised on and not a joint representation with the subsidiary that ultimately was sold.

And just one other point just so that I don't let it go unsaid. The stock purchase agreement, the representations and warranties made in that are not made by the AGA Colorado entity. The paragraph that was read by Newmont's counsel is simply a reference to all the parties have to perform all the things that the contract tells those parties to do. It's the standard performance of obligation provision. And the reps and warrants made and the obligations for those reps and warrants are not made by AGA Colorado. So I don't think that argument lends any credence to this blurring argument that's being made. I think the line is clear. Everyone agrees with it. because the subject matter of the advice might be the CC&V asset that was sold does not mean that that creates a joint representation for every single thing that AGA was advised about CC&V from its lawyers.

THE COURT: I guess where I come out, and I have spent frankly the better part of today trying to puzzle through this because I think it's quite complicated on some level, but I think where I come out at the moment is essentially where I started, which is that my view is that anything where these attorneys acted on behalf of or in the interest of AGA Colorado or CC&V should be produced, and anything where the attorneys worked on a matter for AGA that related to these subsidiaries should not be produced, at least without more.

And my view is that otherwise I think the privilege gets swallowed up unnecessarily and improperly, because then you would have what I think the defendants characterized as an overly expansive interpretation of the joint privilege here, and it would mean that any time a parent sells one of its subsidiaries, it in some way is giving up its right to be the recipient of legal advice from lawyers without that advice being privileged, and I don't think that can be right. And that, it seems to me, cuts to sort of the heart of where these issues are.

So I think, at least on the record as it's presented and on my best reading of the privilege log as it's been presented, I am not prepared to compel the defendants to produce more than they have. But I want to be very clear that they have to be guided by the principle that, if these individuals acted on behalf of the subsidiaries, any documents,

including any that may be on this log, should be re-reviewed and produced if they really properly fall into that category.

And I think, Ms. Moskowitz, in light of our conference, I would direct you and your colleagues to review a further time these 56 items and verify that they all fall into the category of -- and you will represent in writing to your adversary on further review -- that they all fall into the category, what we have called category B, where they may be related to but they are not on-behalf-of-type documents, if I can use that shorthand.

MS. MOSKOWITZ: We will do so, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think that's how I am going to leave that issue for today, mindful that I think it's a complex issue and I think it's a difficult issue to frankly develop the record further than it is, through no fault of the plaintiffs. But I do think to some extent the plaintiff is, and this sounds more pejorative than I mean it, but speculating to some extent, as you have to when you review a privilege log, as to what a document may entail, and I am just not satisfied that there is a sufficient basis in the record for me to direct that these documents be compelled.

Why don't we talk about Exhibit B, and I gather we are really talking about three particular documents now, is that right, or am I misunderstanding?

MR. SZEWCZYK: I think that's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: So one of them it seems to me isn't very hard to understand, but the other two I think raise more questions for me. Let me just get my papers related to that in front of me.

So the first one, which has been Bates stamped 706104, which is Docket No. 73-2 at page 16 of the ECF numbering, this appears to be an e-mail from Mr. Chancellor to Mr. Christensen and Ms. Martelon, all of whom are AGA in-house counsel. So why, Mr. Szewczyk, would that be something not privileged?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, I think it gets back to the discussion we just had relating to the blurred lines, but I am not sure that there is a lot more to be said above and beyond what we have already just discussed.

THE COURT: OK. That one strikes me not a hard call, at least relative to what we have discussed, and I think that should be privileged.

The other two raise more questions for me. Why don't we look at what has been Bates stamped 737992.

So these are e-mails -- well, why don't you tell me what these are rather than my sort of postulating what they are.

Ms. Moskowitz, why don't you tell me what this is, who these people are, and why this is privileged.

I mean, this is the one that says, "I don't want to send hares racing so let's keep it low key." That is sort of

provocative. I don't know what this really entails this correspondence here.

MS. MOSKOWITZ: The portion that we redacted, as indicated in the privilege log, and I am pulling it up right now, but the portion that we redacted related to a request for legal advice from outside counsel by AGA employees and inside counsel about a potential joint venture structure for the potential sale of CC&V.

THE COURT: Who are the lawyers on these e-mails to whom this request is being made?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Ms. R. Sanz is Ms. Ria Sanz, who is the general counsel of AGA. And there is an outside counsel Honigman, who is the outside counsel from whom that was directed.

THE COURT: I don't see them on this document. I see the e-mail from Chris Coetzee to Paul Dennison, copying Paris Aposporis and Warren Gordon Dingwall, and then a response with those same parties. I don't see the names you just mentioned.

MS. MOSKOWITZ: One moment, your Honor, if you would.

The text of the e-mail is referencing the request.

It's not in the CC line. It's a reference to a request that would be made.

THE COURT: So it's a request from AGA personnel for legal advice to a lawyer?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Yes. I believe it's reflecting that

legal advice would be sought from that outside counsel as opposed to it being the exact transmission of that request for advice.

THE COURT: I am not sure, Mr. Szewczyk, this is going to rock your world one way or the other frankly. But if that's what it is, then it seems to me probably properly redacted. Do you want to argue otherwise?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, I think I agree that it probably doesn't rock our world one way or the other. I think by the nature of the document it seems like it may be a bit aggressive to have this level of redaction if all of this could be questions or reflecting legal advice from Ms. Sanz just based on the subject of the e-mail.

THE COURT: You may be right about that. On the other hand, the amount of print that's been redacted is rather small. So I am not even sure how illuminating, whatever it may be beyond, we want to talk to you about this, or can you give me advice about this, it's going to be even if it were unredacted. So I think I am probably going to just leave this as it is.

The other one is 724252?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Yes, your Honor. I am pulling that one up as well. I believe it's a similar situation where it's reflecting the legal advice of outside counsel, including the Honigman folks, same as the last one, as well as Cravath, as indicated in the privilege log entry. I am just pulling it up

right now to see if I can give it any more color.

Yes, your Honor. I just confirmed it's saying, based upon the discussion with Cravath and Honigman. I guess we could have unredacted that one piece and then redacted the rest, but I am representing that the beginning of what was redacted says based upon the discussion with Cravath and Honigman.

THE COURT: OK. Well, I mean, if that's in fact what it is, then I am not going to overrule the redaction that's been made there.

My law clerk is telling me this document is a multipage document. So I don't have it all in front of me here.

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Yes, your Honor. And it's all part of the same discussion.

THE COURT: OK.

MS. MOSKOWITZ: It's a very long e-mail that summarizes that advice.

THE COURT: Mr. Szewczyk, do you want to be heard further?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, the other pages that you indicated that you don't have in front of you, it's multiple pages fully redacted, and it is written by Mr. Dennison. So unless it's verbatim reflecting everything that was from Cravath and Honigman, it would seem like some of this should

not be redacted, just based on the sheer volume of redaction and otherwise the topic of the e-mail.

THE COURT: Ms. Moskowitz, you have the document in front of you unredacted. Is the document such that it is entirely a summary of legal advice provided by counsel, is that literally what it is?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: My reading of this, sitting here right now, is that it is a very extensive chart with questions, and then the answers were filled in based on that discussion. So that is my reading of this, is that it is a lengthy summary of lawyers' answers to various questions in connection with the deal, yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Szewczyk, I take your point, and I think there has been what it seems to me like very aggressive redactions in this case, but at least as Ms. Moskowitz just described that last document to me, I am not prepared to overrule the redactions that have been made if it is exactly as described, and as an officer of the court I will accept her representation to that effect.

So what else, if anything, is there with respect to Exhibit B that we need to discuss further?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Your Honor, I think the only issue, to the extent it would be separate from before, would be the notes of Mr. Chancellor when he was at the meeting with the CC&V operators discussing problems with the CC&V Mill, and

potentially about the CC&V litigation. Because I know while there are blurred lines and it can be difficult, it seems at least in that instance there would have to be some joint privilege, whereas Mr. Chancellor would be acting at least in part on behalf of CC&V or AngloGold Colorado in that context of a discussion.

THE COURT: Ms. Moskowitz, that sounds right to me. Why is that not correct?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Your Honor, I apologize. Are we talking about the notes?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Your Honor, I don't see any difference between the situation and the other lines that have been drawn with respect to e-mails reflecting legal advice. The individuals who were taking the notes in this context were acting on behalf of AGA and not on behalf of CC&V. And simply because either a CC&V employee was present or Newmont was present certainly doesn't make their notes part of a joint privilege that was being held, and the idea that AGA couldn't be represented separately from what was going on in that litigation I don't think follows from the fact that they took notes from those meetings, any more than me taking notes from a meet and confer with Newmont would entitle them to my notes.

THE COURT: And that's the analogy you're drawing here, that what Mr. Christensen was doing in the notes he was

making were to serve the interest of AGA and not CC&V?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Correct.

THE COURT: But technically the notes might well have also served the interest of CC&V, no?

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Certainly, hypothetically, yes, and I think we did in fact produce unredacted versions of notes when that applied, similar to the line we drew on the e-mail correspondence, so that when that was true they got them, and when it wasn't true we didn't produce them. So I think we attempted to apply the same principle to the handwritten notes as we did to the other types of documents in the case.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think for consistency sake, if nothing else, I think I will stand by my prior rulings, and the principles underlying them as discussed, and apply that to the notes we are talking about now and not require their production either for the same reasons.

I guess put another way, if I am wrong, I am wrong all the way around in that regard. But I think the line drawing that was made is something that seems, to my way of thinking, consistent with my understanding of the law as it would apply to the facts in this relatively sophisticated complex context here.

Anything else from counsel that we need to address on this call?

MR. SZEWCZYK: Nothing else from plaintiff.

MS. MOSKOWITZ: Nothing from defendants, your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: OK. I want to keep you all on the line for a minute, but I am going to go off the record and tell the court reporter that she doesn't need to stay. I just want to talk to you all about something else. So I am going to excuse the court reporter with your permission. OK? MS. MOSKOWITZ: Thank you, your Honor. MR. SZEWCZYK: Thank you, your Honor. (Adjourned)